A just-released World Bank analysis notes that SOEs overseen by
the central government's State-Owed Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) made net profits of RMB 299
billion during the first half of 2005 and RMB 400 billion in
2004. All non-financial SOEs, including those administered by
provincial and municipal authorities, earned RMB 759 billion in
2003. Some publicly-listed SOEs do pay significant
dividends. But, for historical reasons largely associated
with China's 1994 tax reform, no government entity -- neither
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) nor SASAC -- receives any
dividends from large centrally-administered SOEs. This
pattern mostly applies as well to local governments and
locally-administered SOEs. This is in contrast other
countries, where the state, as key shareholder, normally receives
dividends from SOEs, just like any other shareholder.
A sound dividend policy for China's SOEs could enhance the
efficiency of re-investments by SOEs and improve the overall
allocation of public financial resources.
Corporate sector saving -- including by SOEs -- is a key
contributor to China's high rates of saving and investment.
At about 20 percent of GDP -- double the share in the U.S. and
France -- retained earnings finance more than one-half of
enterprise investment.
Excessive use of retained earnings to facilitate industrial
expansion poses disadvantages, however, for China's developing
economy. Within-firm allocation of capital may not receive
the same scrutiny as channeling via the financial sector, which may
hurt efficiency. Lack of scrutiny may lead to pro-cyclical
investment, making the economy more prone to "boom and bust"
cycles. These issues are of particular concern where
corporate governance is weak.
Notably, the State has borne most of the restructuring costs for
China's SOEs, taking over social obligations such as schools and
hospitals as well as unemployment benefits and worker
pensions. Indeed, the shedding of these obligations has
played a big part in the rise in SOE profits -- all the more reason
for the State to recover some of its costs.
Among individual companies in OECD countries, dividend payout
ratios vary widely, tending to reflect each company's growth
prospects and business cyclicality.
Should SOE dividends be submitted to MOF or managed by SASAC as
part of a "state assets management budget?" In principle, SOE
profits and privatization proceeds are public financial revenues,
whose disposition should be subject to the budget process and
National People's Congress (NPC) approvals. Better
prioritization of public spending across sectors requires an
integrated budgeting process in which all available public
financial resources are allocated according to one set of criteria
to meet public needs.
The current non-payment of dividends implicitly assumes that
there is no better use of SOE profits other than re-investment back
into SOEs. Clearly, however, China faces urgent challenges in
refocusing its public spending to improve key services. For
example, if 50 percent of SOE profits, estimated at 6.5 percent of
GDP in 2004, were distributed to the budget, this would support an
85 percent increase in government spending on education and
health.
Among OECD countries, the norm is for SOE profits to go to the
finance ministry for general public uses, whichever agency acts as
state shareholder.
Thus, while SASAC acts as the state shareholder, both theory and
international best practices suggest that SOE dividends and any
privatization proceeds should go to the MOF. This may give
rise to practical concerns, for instance about SASAC's incentives
to collect dividends and its capacity to finance ongoing structural
reforms among SOEs. Further debate on the still-undefined
nature of a "state assets management budget" and SASAC's role in
ongoing structural adjustment of China's SOEs is warranted.
Whichever approach to dividend distribution is adopted, SASAC's
budget and resources should be subject to the same NPC scrutiny as
any other fiscal resources.
(China.org.cn February 10, 2006)
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